Archive for the ‘Crisis Communications’ Category

Verdict on American Airlines’ Bankruptcy Comms – Good So Far

Tuesday, November 29th, 2011

Courtesy AA.comDuring my putative lunch today (29 Nov) the erstwhile Roula Amire of Ragan.com asked if I’d write a quick post on the bankruptcy communications coming out of AMR Corp., the parent company of American Airlines.  At first I said no, too busy, but as my home office was still captive to contractors, I quickly reconsidered and wrote something (thank you, Panera wi-fi!).

Bop over to read my piece. I’ll tell you this much — given the requirements of lawyers and the, I don’t know, 12 different constituencies they needed to satisfy, I think they did a good job.  I like the Facebook video from AMR’s CEO, and the customer service Twitter stream pointing people to FAQs.

This is another case of “Dirt-sandwich-and-everybody-has-to-take-a-bite.” There’s not much we can do but smile and chew.

 

 

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Herman Cain as Crisis Lesson

Wednesday, November 9th, 2011

Others have already written on this topic, so I’ll offer just a few things to consider when discussing Republican Presidential candidate Herman Cain.  Foremost is the distinction between legal advice and public relations advice: they’re not the same thing.

There are four women who’ve claimed that Cain offered unwanted and unwelcome sexual advances during the 1990′s, when Cain led the National Restaurant Association. All four were employees of the NRA, though one was no longer an employee when she claimed the harassment occurred. Two filed complaints and received cash settlements. To others did not file complaints. Legally, payment of settlements is not proof of guilt. PR-wise, most people would say they are.

Legal-beagles are no doubt telling Cain to deny these incidents occurred. No one can prove otherwise, legally.  Sexual harassment seldom occurs with witnesses present. Ask President Clinton about his experience with these matters. His alleged behavior while governor of Arkansas was orders of magnitude more egregious — state troopers acting as spotters? Dropping trou to Paula Jones? And then there’s Monica Lewinsky — hmm, leader of the free world and white house intern?

Under the law, sexual harassment has two potential proof points — hostile work environment or quid pro quo. Pattern of harassment that creates the hostile environment or swapping sex for employment. Under the law, being a boor isn’t a crime.

So for an attorney, there’s no evidence of sexual harassment. For a PR counsel, that simply doesn’t matter. Who here believes that these four women made all this up, especially the two who filed complaints and received cash?  One publicity-seeking money-hound is one thing. Four is another.

Meanwhile, Cain denies, and the story is hot every day. What if Cain’s news conference had featured this statement:

My fellow Americans, as much as it pains me to say it, there was a time in my life when I behaved less than admirably regarding my relationships with women, and the allegations you have seen and read lately stem from that dark period some 15 years ago. By the grace of God and the support of my family, I was able to recognize that though my actions did not fit the legal definition of sexual harassment, they were still inappropriate and wrong. I deeply regret my actions and have sought support and guidance from my family and my faith to become a better man, a better Christian.

We could wordsmith this to death, of course, but where does the media go after hearing this? Cain could have taken questions, and to each that asked for details, reply that there’s no point in rehashing the incidents, and that he is very sorry for the pain he caused to the recipients of his unwanted attentions.

Of course, the whole thing flares up again if there are additional allegations from after the NRA, particularly Godfather’s Pizza, where he was CEO. The other thing to keep in mind is that the case against President Clinton was more substantive on par — more people, the Troopergate material, and a continuing pattern.

Chances are, Cain won’t get the nomination anyway — but I don’t think it’s the end of his campaign.

 

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Some Crises Are ‘No-Win’

Monday, August 23rd, 2010

In a balanced article in the 22 August New York Times, writer Peter S. Goodman talks to a heap of PR folks about the Goldman Sachs, Toyota and BP communication nightmares. It’s a good piece, especially one graf:

“Which raises a question: Are some crises so dire that public relationship victory is simply not on the menu? And, if so, what’s an embattled company to do?”

After living through the financial crisis with a regional bank, I can tell you that we did wonder whether there was anything we could do differently to try and make our sow’s ear into a silk purse. Or even just a paper bag, anything except what we were getting.

The question of visceral hatred that we see for Goldman Sachs and BP isn’t equaled for Toyota. Of course, the corporate reputations of both Goldman and BP weren’t near as positive prior to their crises as Toyota’s. In the Goldman case, was public opinion merely scapegoating a convenient target? We didn’t much like the idea that this company was busy racking up big profits whilst the average Joe saw 401 (k) collapses, layoffs and strife. BP had held itself out as a new breed (Beyond Petroleum). Meanwhile, Toyota had become the largest auto company in the world on the strength of perceived exceptionally high quality. There was more goodwill built up around Toyota, and although they had a few bumps, they seem to be returning to their lofty status.

One expert quoted in the article said when the facts are horrible, “the best PR fix may simply be to absorb the pounding and get back to business, while eschewing the sort of foolish communication gimmicks that can make things worse.”

We see, however, how heavy the pounding can get when companies decide to stonewall or be overly parsimonious in their statements. But I agree that sometimes, the news is just so bad, so damaging, that there’s no way to win. So, the question becomes, just how much crisis medicine are you willing to take?

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Amazon’s Recovery from Kindle Content Deletion Crisis Evaluated

Wednesday, March 24th, 2010

In the middle of 2009, owners of e-reader Kindle got a nasty surprise when Amazon snatched back e-books that it turned out were supplied illegally. Amazon’s supplier didn’t have the rights to distribute the content, so Amazon accessed Kindles and deleted it.

Seems like no problem to me, but then, I don’t have a Kindle. Amazon got to enjoy seven days of flame and shouting for its trouble.

Drs. W. Timothy Coombs and Sherry J. Holladay of Eastern Illinois University (kind of a hotbed of pithy PR scholarship), presented a paper about Amazon’s week from hell at the 13th International PR Research Conference.  Dr. Coombs is a preeminent theorist on crisis communication, the author of several books and papers about it, and a good presenter who carries a quick wit with his slide rule.  He a smart dude.

Apparently, the “Kindle Community” was pretty angry about having “their” stuff unceremoniouslyyanked. Amazon’s notification statement lacked complete information, or ordinary human compassion, according to those who read it:

“The Kindle edition books Animal Farm by George Orwell, published by MobileReference (mobi) and 1984 by George Orwell, published by MobileReference (mobi) were removed from the Kindle store and are no longer available for purchase. When this occurred, your purchases were automatically refunded. you can still locate the books in the Kindle store, but each has a status of not yet available. Although are rarity, publishers can decide to pull their content from the Kindle store.”

Commenters went ballistic, and before you could blink, there were boycotts threatened. So Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos posted an abject apology, saying in part: “Our ‘solution’ to the problem was stupid, thoughtless, and painfully out of line with our principles.” He beat on his company pretty hard.

Coombs and Holladay found that the florid, nearly over-the-top apology worked very well. 71 percent accepted the apology, nearly 16 percent accepted it conditionally, and just 13 percent rejected it.  More important, more than 21 percent indicated they were more likely to buy from Amazon versus 10.5 percent said they were less likely to buy.

So what’s that mean? It means that Coombs’ main theories of crisis communication are holding steady in the online world — the process of admitting you’ve done wrong, taking steps to rectify the situation and ensure it won’t happen again, and beating yourself up a bit in the process result in restoring positive feelings among your stakeholders.

There surely are crises where this won’t happen — some things are just too bad — but this study gives additional support to the basis for advice during crisis times.

Watch for the complete paper in May when the IPRRC proceedings are released.

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Washington’s Blame Game

Monday, February 22nd, 2010

Ever since the financial markets first froze in mid-2007, nearly collapsed in Sept. 2008 and rode a roller coaster in 2009, a tidal wave of anger has washed out rational discourse on the topic. My friend Mindy quipped, “They want heads on pikes. They want to see blood.”

This so-called “populist” anger at banks and “Wall Street” has a familiar tone to it. Fat Cat Banker is a standard phrase. President Franklin Roosevelt blamed the bankers for the Great Depression, and any significant downturn since has rekindled the fires of main street fury, some of it well-deserved.

But I’m troubled by the willingness to apportion the greatest share of blame to banks and bankers. Neither the cause of nor the solution to the financial crisis still gripping the U.S. and the developed world can be understood with examining the role of government.

The U.S. government wants more people to own homes — “The Ownership Society” is one where more people have skin in the game, a vested interest in their domiciles that makes them more stable, more involved citizens.  For many years, government has insisted that banks lend to people at the margins of financial capacity, a legacy of the shameful process of “redlining.” Redlining withdrew banks from lending in a given area, regardless of the potential creditworthiness of borrowers in that area. Add lending policies that were openly racist and you’ve got a problem that needed to be fixed.

The government, however, wasn’t content. It still wanted more people to get loans and buy things, because that’s how our economy has operated during the last 30 years. No consumer spending, no prosperity.  Getting people to buy during a period when their incomes weren’t rising much if at all means they need to borrow — and what better way to borrow than to take advantage of soaring real estate values?

So the government creates programs to shift lending risk — Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac — so that banks could make loans and get repaid very early, even as they retain the servicing rights to the loans; you’re still writing the check to the bank, but your loan is no longer on the books. Fannie and Freddie then sell blocks of loans to investors, further removing the bank and the agencies from the risk. The investors love the stable returns and hedge their risk by buying insurance — credit default swaps or “derivatives” — to insulate their income stream from the original borrower’s ability to pay.

When the borrower hits hard times, what happens? Who is to blame when the interrelated instruments start to fall apart?

Some blame does go to the banks. They bought the securities and created the derivatives. Some blame goes to the government, for fostering a climate that led to a bubble in real estate and writing laws that led to a wild west risk environment. Some needs to go to borrowers who bought too much house with too much debt.

In today’s Wall Street Journal, a story about Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner’s political travails talks about a frame that makes him — a lifelong public servant — into an apologist for and a tool of Wall Street.  The financial bailout of the banks was a horrible moment, he says, but it worked. It stabilized the financial system, prevented what could have been a disastrous run on the banks (that’s really what put us into the Great Depression” and it’s costing a fraction of the $700 billion budgeted for it. The banks are doing better financially, and they’re paying the money back to the Treasury with interest.

But we live in a “fact-irrelevant” society these days, and in Washington, few seem to care about making good government. The Congress — with its desire for public hangings, preferably of bankers — seems willing to abrogate contracts and violate its own laws in order to put heads on pikes, spinning.  And they’re relying on half-truths, mis-characterizations, and crafted frames to do it.

Our public relations toolkit shouldn’t be used in this fashion. It’s dishonest.

Besides, why invest so much effort in revenge? Confucius said, “Before you embark on a journey of revenge, dig two graves.”

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Driving Me Crazy: Southwest Didn’t Err

Wednesday, February 17th, 2010

Sometimes I really think the end of the republic is nigh.  A large man who usually buys two seats (because he is so large) wants to snag an earlier flight which has only one seat, cannot fit without discomfort to himself and his hapless row-mates, so he cries, “discrimination!” Oh, and he also has a new film coming out soon. Hmmmmm. Grrrrrr.

According to a story in the Newark Star-Ledger website, Kevin Smith fit into the middle seat with the armrests down, but the flight crew believed he was a safety risk and removed him from the aircraft. Smith activated his 1.6 million Twitter followers to take Southwest Airlines to task.

The story clips from several bloggers, including Sonny Gill, the HuffPo and a couple of others. The debate seems to be over whether airlines need to make accommodations for “persons of size.”

Southwest has a policy. If you’re big, buy two seats. Smith knew the policy and often did so, according to numerous media reports.  As a frequent traveler, I know that it’s good to get home early if you can. But if my choice is to wait a while and have my comfy two seats instead of being a human Panini, I’m waiting.

We all know that air travel today is like bus travel in 1966 (which I remember, thanks) — crowded into old, creaky seats, mashed together, with substandard sanitary facilities and somewhat, er, limited cuisine.  Southwest does a fab job, in my book, of making a rather unpleasant task bearable,  mostly with good cheer, Heineken and tasty bags of peanuts.

I don’t think they needed to apologize.

I can’t shake the idea that the esteemed Mr. Smith is subscribing to the old adage that all publicity is good. I wonder if we compare movie openings press coverage, that his clip count will be higher this time around.

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Cargill opts for simplicity in NYT e-coli story

Monday, October 5th, 2009

The Oct. 4 edition of the New York Times contains a harrowing story of how a tainted hamburger put a young woman into a nine-week coma and left her paralyzed. The bad beef came from megafood processor Cargill, which answered the Times’ inquiry with, “Cargill is not in a position to answer your specific questions, other than to state that we are committed to continuous improvement in the area of food safety.” According to the story, Cargill cited the ongoing litigation as the reason for its brief response.  This shouldn’t be surprising.  In fact, I can argue convincingly that it’s exactly the right response.

How can Cargill “win” here?  With the case still pending, the woman still paralyzed and little likelihood that the story can be made positive, Why would Cargill do anything different? Any statements of sympathy or discussion of changing inspection processes (a strong sub-story) could damage Cargill in court.  Nothing the company could say would convince anyone that Cargill was anything but a greedy bunch of capitalists, willing to sacrifice customer health on the alter of profit.

Am I wrong?

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Handling ‘No-Win’ Media Stories

Monday, August 10th, 2009

The Taliban resurgent in Afghanistan.  The U.S. House wants to spend $550 million on new jets for themselves. Banks fork over billions in bonuses after receiving trillions in U.S. taxpayer funds.  How’d you like to be the PR folks who need to handle those issues?

When I was relatively young in public relations, our top-five execs were poised to gather up a prodigious pile of cash, stock and options — they hit their targets, and then some, for the year.  The main way they’d done so, however, was to cut headcount by 10 percent across the board.  Preparing the internal communications for that proxy release (which would include the compensation details) wasn’t an easy task.

There were good business reasons for the compensation strategy, not the least that there were contractual obligations — they were owed this compensation. The packages had all been vetted by the compensation committee of the board of directors, comprised only of “outside” directors — people who weren’t also employees of the company.  The goals for the year were bottom-line oriented, aligning the interests of the executives with those of the shareholders.  A substantial amount of the dollar value of the pay was long-term compensation — three years’ deferred. And, the largest portion of the package was in restricted stock and stock options, both of which were designed to keep high-performing executives at the company for several years.

After reading the proxy, I felt reasonably comfortable with the reasons for the high pay.  I wrote a paragraph not too different from this last one in a questions-and-answers document for managers, answering the question, “Why did these executives get such high compensation?”

The corporate treasurer called me, with a smile in his voice, and said, “This is an argument you can’t win. Let’s not try to explain the reasons for the packages. Just say that there may be questions as a consequence of news media coverage and refer interested parties to the Proxy.”

I was pretty disappointed.  I’m a fan of sharing the reasons behind decisions. Of course, the danger here was the snicker factor.

The snicker factor is the likelihood that that people will snicker when they read the explanation, that the intent of being transparent and honest will instead be seen as spin.

The reality is that executive pay is a tough story. The reality is that contracts tend to insulate execs from downside risk, that the independent directors are execs at other firms, their motives suspect… You can almost hear the conversation around the water cooler, visualize the Tweets… “Yeah, right! These guys all take care of their own, they’ll do anything to get their piece of the pie, what do they do around here, anyway?”

Do we only explain if there is a likelihood of winning the argument? That certainly would simplify the measurement of our efforts in these matters. By the way, I’m aware of at least one company that, as a matter of policy, separates proactive and positive PR from reactive and negative PR. They feel like they have a great track record and lots of positive reinforcement.  It’s not exactly what the Excellence Theory calls for (two-way, symmetrical), but it has its fans.

For another firm, staying out of any no-win story was the primary objective, and they did (and do) a fine job of it.

As long as we define our function as one of advocacy — and are above board about it — this makes perfect sense.  In those circumstances, we adopt the model that calls for non-participation if there is no objective benefit to our organization. We increase reputation risk by not participating, but perhaps that’s the main question: How risky is participating and explaining compared to staying away from such controversy?

It seems to me to be a question of certain risk versus uncertain risk — we know the snicker factor will kick in if we participate. We don’t know what will happen if we don’t.

Avoiding the devil you know can be a compelling strategy. What do you think?

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